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In the mid-1990s, mainstream economists of nearly all stripes commonly 
recommended capital account liberalization – that is, allowing a free flow of funds in and out 
of a country’s economy -- as an essential step in the process of economic development. 
Indeed, in September 1997, the governing body of the International Monetary Fund (1997) 
sought to make “the liberalization of capital movements one of the purposes of the IMF, and 
extend as needed, the IMF’s jurisdiction …regarding the liberalization of such movements.” 
But then came the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, in which even seemingly healthy 
and well-managed economies like those of South Korea were engulfed by massive capital 
outflows and tremendous currency volatility, and capital account liberalization became quite 
controversial in the economics profession. For example, Fischer (1998) and Summers (2000) 
continued to make the case for capital account liberalization, while Rodrik (1998) and 
Stiglitz (2000) were skeptical. 
A decade later, now that time has quelled passions and intervening research can shed 
more light on the debate, it appears that both the costs and benefits of capital account 
liberalization may have been misunderstood in that earlier debate. The major benefit of 
capital account liberalization was allegedly that it would help low-income countries expand 
investment and thus generate higher rates of economic growth. However, cross-country 
regressions suggest little connection from foreign capital inflows to more rapid economic 
growth for such countries. This suggests that the lack of domestic savings is not the primary 
constraint on growth in these economies, as implicitly assumed in the benchmark 
neoclassical framework.  
So is openness to capital flows irrelevant? Probably not! The debate is refocusing on 
a different set of benefits, primarily the indirect or “collateral” benefits that accrue to a 
country’s governance and institutions when it opens up to cross-border capital flows. It is 
also looking at some other costs, primarily the real exchange rate overvaluation and loss of 
competitiveness that can occur when foreign capital floods in, rather than the more traditional 
risk of “sudden stops” when foreign (and domestic) investors take fright and head for the 
exits.   
But if the benefits are large why don’t we see them in cross-country regressions of 
growth against net foreign financing? One explanation could be that there are threshold 
levels of institutional development only above which the costs exceed the benefits – this    3  
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could explain why the correlation between growth and the use of foreign capital is strongly 
positive for industrial countries but not for low-income countries. Another is that the 
collateral benefits of openness to foreign capital are greater at higher levels of development 
while the associated costs and risks are greater at lower levels of development. A third is that 
crude quantity-based measures of the use of foreign finance, such as the current account 
deficit or gross inflows, may not capture the influence of foreign capital. These explanations 
are not mutually exclusive.  
There is then somewhat of a Catch-22 situation for countries that might be close to, 
but below the undoubtedly difficult-to-define threshold. It is this; the country’s institutions 
will likely improve with greater openness to financial flows, allowing the country to 
eventually secure net gains from openness, but it may be exposed to significant immediate 
costs. This is where the pragmatic approach kicks in – opening up further when costs are 
likely to be lower, and attempting to take steps to reduce the costs even further.    
 All this assumes that policy makers have the luxury of being able to decide when to 
increase or decrease their economy’s openness to capital flows. But increasingly, they may 
not have much option. The enormous expansion in trade around the world offers a conduit 
for disguising capital account transactions, through under-invoicing and over-invoicing for 
example, which inevitably will result in the further de facto opening of the capital account. 
Thus, open capital accounts are a looming reality in virtually every country, irrespective of 
the formal capital control regime in place. In this situation, policymakers in emerging market 
economies should see their job as how to manage the speed and scope of capital account 
liberalization, not whether to liberalize at all.   
 
Challenges to the Conventional Story of International Financial Integration 
 
The conventional presumption about international financial integration is that it 
should enable capital to flow from high-income countries, with relatively high capital-labor 
ratios, to low-income countries with lower capital-labor ratios (see Lucas, 1990). If 
investment in poor countries is constrained by the low level of domestic saving, access to 
foreign capital should boost their growth – and it would also allow residents of richer    4  
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countries to get higher returns on their savings invested abroad. However, this conventional 
story has a variety of shortcomings. Let us start by discussing foreign capital inflows.  
 
Missing Links from Capital Inflows to Growth 
 
Many economists believe that productivity growth, rather than just accumulation of 
inputs, is the main determinant of long-term growth (for example, Solow, 1956; Hall and 
Jones, 1999). A corollary is that foreign capital inflows by themselves should only have 
temporary effects on growth. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) use calibrations of a 
parameterized general equilibrium model to argue that the effects on economic growth of 
opening up to capital inflows are likely to be small precisely because productivity growth is 
the main determinant of long-term growth. Similarly, Henry (2006) points out that the 
benefits of equity market liberalizations on investment and output growth are likely to be of 
short duration, unless the resulting financial market development fundamentally changes 
productivity growth. Of course, for countries with very low levels of investment the short run 
of adjusting to higher levels of factor inputs could be several decades long, and so the search 
for a positive correlation between capital flows, investment and growth is not without 
theoretical grounding.  
However, empirical studies using macroeconomic data typically do not find that 
inflows of foreign capital have spurred growth in developing countries. For example, 
Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2004) find that developing countries with higher self-
financing ratios (share of domestic investment accounted for by domestic savings) turn in 
better growth performances on average. Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007; henceforth, 
PRS) document that nonindustrial countries that have relied less on foreign finance—that is, 
countries that have run smaller current account deficits or even run current account 
surpluses—have not grown slower (and, in many cases, have grown faster) over the last three 
decades than those more reliant on external capital. Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, Wei (2006)    5  
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conclude from a more extensive survey that there is little evidence that financial integration 
has a robust positive correlation with GDP growth.
1 
Moreover, Lucas (1990) noted that capital flows from industrial to developing 
countries were much smaller than the levels predicted by the conventional story of capital 
flows between countries with differing capital-labor ratios. During the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, the “Lucas paradox” has intensified as emerging market economies 
have, on net, been exporting capital to richer industrial economies, mostly in the form of 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, which are largely invested in industrial country 
government bonds. These “uphill flows” of capital have had no discernible adverse impact on 
the growth of developing economies, which suggests that the paucity of resources for 
investment is not the key constraint to growth in these economies.  
  One possible explanation is that perhaps low-income countries are not primarily 
“savings-constrained” but the profitability of the investment opportunities they offer is very 
limited. This may be because they lack institutions protecting property rights (so private 
investment, if profitable, risks expropriation) or because their financial system is 
underdeveloped so investor rights are not protected (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and 
Volosovych, 2007). In these economies where the lack of important domestic institutions 
constrains investment, Rodrik and Subramanian (2008) argue foreign capital inflows may be 
disproportionately used to finance consumption, leading to an overvalued exchange rate, and 
an even greater reduction in the profitability of investment. This may explain the negative 
correlation between foreign capital inflows and growth, as well as the positive correlation 
between foreign capital inflows and exchange rate overvaluation, that PRS (2007) find. 
   Yet this cannot be the entire story. What about countries like China or India that are 
experiencing investment booms? Why are they not big users of foreign capital? One 
possibility is that the very improvement in domestic institutions that enhances investment 
opportunities also enhances incentives for domestic households to save (or keep their savings 
in the country). Indeed, the improvement in domestic savings may be a better proxy for the 
                                                 
1 Some recent studies based on data over longer time spans and using finer measures of financial integration 
have turned up more positive evidence of the benefits of financial integration; for example, see Quinn and 
Toyoda (2006) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005). But these scattered pieces of positive evidence are 
far from conclusive.     6  
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true improvement in the quality of institutions, and hence investment opportunities. So 
countries that invest more, but are able to finance more of it with domestic savings grow 
faster, as PRS (2007) find, but this may have nothing to do with whether foreign capital is 
bad for growth, and everything to do with the quality of investment opportunities in countries 
that finance more through domestic savings.   
  In sum, there is little evidence that low income countries have a tremendous gap 
between domestic investment and savings that holds back growth, a gap that can be plugged 
by foreign capital as the traditional literature would suggest. Some simply don’t have good 
investment opportunities (and the factors that depress investment may depress domestic 
savings even further, forcing these countries to rely on foreign capital), while those that have 
investment opportunities may also be able to generate adequate domestic savings. But what 
then are the benefits of financial openness more generally, and foreign capital inflows 
specifically?   
 
Collateral Benefits and Institution Building from Financial Liberalization 
 
Openness to capital flows can expose a country’s financial sector to competition, spur 
improvements in domestic corporate governance as foreign investors demand the same 
standards locally that they are used to at home, and impose discipline on macroeconomic 
policies, and the government more generally. So even if foreign capital is not needed for 
financing, it may be that financial openness (to both inflows and outflows) creates “collateral 
benefits” (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei, 2006), such as domestic financial sector 
development (see Rajan and Zingales, 2003a and Stulz 2005), which could enhance growth 
in total factor productivity.  
For instance, international financial flows serve as an important catalyst for domestic 
financial market development, as reflected in both straightforward measures of the size of the 
banking sector and equity markets as well as broader concepts of financial market 
development, including supervision and regulation (see the survey by Mishkin, 2006). 
Foreign bank presence is associated with improvements in the quality of financial services 
and the efficiency of financial intermediation (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2001; Levine, 2001; Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez, 2003; Claessens and Laeven,    7  
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2004; Schmukler, 2004). And stock markets do tend to become larger and more liquid after 
equity market liberalizations (Levine and Zervos, 1998).  
Financial openness has induced a number of countries to adjust their corporate 
governance structures in response to foreign competition and demands from international 
investors (see the evidence surveyed in Gillian and Starks, 2003). Moreover, financial-sector 
foreign direct investment from well-regulated and well-supervised source countries tends to 
support institutional development and governance in emerging markets, providing a sense of 
direction for the complex supervisory and regulatory challenges that developing countries 
face as they integrate into the world economy (Goldberg, 2004).  
  Other collateral benefits could include, for instance, the discipline imposed on 
macroeconomic policies. The logic is that financial openness acts as a commitment device 
since bad policies that result in large government budget deficits or high inflation could lead 
to foreign investors bolting for the exits at the first sign of trouble. The evidence on this point 
is limited, however. Tytell and Wei (2004) find that financial openness is positively 
correlated with lower inflation but uncorrelated with the size of budget deficits.  
If indeed collateral benefits are important, and they come from the possibility of two-
way flows as much as from the actual inflow of foreign capital, then only looking at the 
effects of the latter may be inadequate. The effect of the intrinsic openness of the country to 
cross-border capital flows needs also to be included, the so-called de-jure openness that 
authors such as Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) and Klein and Olivei (2006) have 
examined. The evidence here is rather mixed, in part because the information content of 
measures of capital controls is limited—having legal controls is one thing, enforcing them 
effectively is quite another. Using the sum of the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities, 
which capture the accumulated exposure to international capital markets, as the measure of 
financial integration also yields at best weak evidence of the growth benefits.  
Also, it takes time to build institutions, enhance market discipline and deepen the 
financial sector, which may explain why, over relatively short periods, detecting the benefits 
of financial globalization is difficult. Even at long horizons, it may be difficult to detect the 
productivity-enhancing benefits of financial globalization in empirical work if the analysis 
includes structural, institutional and macroeconomic policy variables. After all, these are the 
very channels through which financial integration generates growth benefits.     8  
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Thresholds for Benefiting from Financial Openness 
 
But perhaps the biggest problem in detecting collateral benefits in long run cross-
country regressions may be that they kick in only when a country is above a certain level of 
institutional and economic development. For instance, when property rights are unprotected 
or the judiciary is very weak, there may be little that foreign investors can do to improve 
corporate governance. It is only when there is a minimum threshold level of these institutions 
that arm’s length foreigners can press for better governance. It may also be that only when a 
country is more advanced and close to the technological frontiers can it use the full 
capabilities that foreign financial know-how brings, such as the ability to discriminate 
between alternative sets of investment opportunities. When a country is very poor, the 
investments that are needed may be much more obvious, provided appropriate protections are 
in place.   
Indeed, it may be that below the threshold, financial openness could be detrimental 
(see the evidence in PRS, 2007). For example, foreign investors are often depicted as arm’s 
length investors who cut and run at the first sight of trouble. If this is not entirely a caricature, 
a country with an inadequate regime to deal with corporate insolvencies could be hurt very 
badly in a panic, as fleeing foreigners bring firms down.  
 In fact, the very nature of foreign engagement may change with improvements in a 
country’s institutional quality—a term that encompasses quality of corporate and public 
governance, the legal framework, government transparency, and level of corruption. Faria 
and Mauro (2004) find that better institutional quality tilts a developing country’s foreign 
inflows towards foreign direct investment and portfolio equity flows, which not only are less 
risky than debt flows, but also lead to more foreign involvement in corporate governance and 
technology transfer. Rajan and Tokatlidis (2005) suggest that countries with limited capacity 
to solve internal fiscal conflicts are likely to have more fragile foreign debt structures, and 
more dollarization. 
Finally, some macroeconomic structures and policies are also typically (though not 
always) associated with underdeveloped countries and lead to greater risks from financial 
openness. Rigid exchange rate regimes can make a country more vulnerable to crises when it 
opens its capital markets (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). A lower level of trade relative to the    9  
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size of the economy increases the probability of crises associated with financial openness and 
increases the costs of such crises if they do occur. Thus, the recent literature strengthens the 
case made by the old sequencing literature for putting trade liberalization ahead of financial 
integration. 
There is some evidence suggesting threshold effects for the correlation between 
openness and growth; Although greater reliance on foreign capital does not seem to be 
associated with growth for non-industrial countries, it is positively associated with growth for 
industrial countries and, over shorter time horizons, for more advanced transition countries 
also (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2007;  Abiad, Leigh, and Mody, 2007). A number of 
papers also suggest that financial depth or the quality of domestic institutions can affect 
growth benefits from capital inflows (for example, Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan and 
Sayek, 2004; Klein, 2005; Chinn and Ito, 2006; Klein and Olivei, 2006). 
 
The Policy Dilemma 
 
If net collateral benefits kicked in beyond a threshold, the policy response would be 
clear – wait till the country is clearly beyond the threshold and then liberalize. The only 
problem then (and not an inconsequential one) would be to determine when the country was 
beyond the threshold. The real dilemma lies, however, in the possibility that openness can 
catalyze some of the institutional and financial sector development that is necessary to obtain 
the collateral benefits of openness. If so, it might make sense for a country to liberalize 
somewhat before it is institutionally developed enough to secure net benefits from openness, 
in order to speed up institutional development itself.   
  Given that there could be merits to opening up even for somewhat underdeveloped 
countries, a country following a pragmatic approach to liberalization would pick periods 
when the risks associated with liberalization are likely to be lower, so that its institutions 
could develop over a relatively benign period, and they are ready when times become 
tougher. What might define such benign periods? That is what we explore in the next section.  
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The Evolution of the Cost-Benefit Tradeoff 
 
Emerging markets and developing countries in recent years have typically run large 
current account surpluses instead of the more traditional deficits. In part, this has been 
because of relatively subdued investment, perhaps because of learning from past crises; in 
part this has been because of expanded savings. For instance, in the Philippines, investment 
fell from 24% of GDP in 1996 to 17% in 2006, while savings rose from 14% to 20% of GDP. 
From borrowing the equivalent of 10% of its GDP from abroad, it has now gone to pumping 
out 2.5% as a current account surplus. 
 
Stock of Foreign Exchange Reserves 
 
In part as a result of trade surpluses, in part as a result of capital inflows because of 
their better economic health, a number of emerging market countries have had a prodigious 
build-up in their foreign exchange reserves as they attempt to stave off large exchange rate 
appreciations by intervening in the foreign exchange market. Figure 1 shows that the total 
stock of foreign exchange reserves held by emerging markets and other developing countries 
skyrocketed to nearly $5 trillion dollars at the end of 2007 (compared to $0.7 trillion in 1995 
and $1.2 trillion in 2000).  
  The level of reserves now held by emerging market countries far exceeds the standard 
guidelines for what is necessary to insure against sudden stops or reversals of capital flows 
(Jeanne, 2007; Durdu, Mendoza and Terrones, 2007; Reddy, 2005). Most emerging markets 
now comfortably meet or exceed the common rules-of-thumb that they should hold liquid 
reserves sufficient to meet all foreign liabilities coming due over the next twelve months, or 
at least six months’ worth of imports. In addition, reserve pooling arrangements, like the 
Chiang Mai Initiative in South East Asia, allow individual countries to swap their domestic 
currencies for U.S. dollars held by other countries in the pool, increasing the insurance value 
of individual country reserve holdings. Of course, such pooling would not provide much 
insurance against common regional shocks that hit all countries in the pool. However, the 
sheer volume of reserves is likely to serve as a deterrent to speculative attacks on a currency, 
making financial crises and their subsequent contagion effects (wherein countries with    11  
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otherwise reasonable macroeconomic conditions get swept along in financial panics) less 
likely in the first place.  
  While foreign exchange reserves provide a useful cushion against financial and 
balance of payments crises, thus making capital account liberalization less risky, they also 
create problems of their own. Many of these economies are finding it increasingly difficult to 
soak up, or “sterilize” (using government bonds), the liquidity created by inflows, so 
pressures for domestic currency appreciation are building. Furthermore, governments are 
increasingly questioning the benefits of a policy that, in essence, involves purchasing more 
low-yield securities from foreign governments financed by higher-yield domestic debt.   
  The surge in foreign exchange reserves has led to three types of responses. One 
approach is to find creative uses for reserves—for instance, using them to recapitalize 
domestic banks, to finance infrastructure spending, or to stockpile oil reserves. China and 
India, for instance, have adopted some of these uses for their reserves.  
  A second approach has been to set up government investment corporations, 
sometimes called “sovereign wealth funds,” that can recycle reserves into high-yielding 
assets. Estimates of assets held by sovereign wealth funds, including those of industrial 
countries such as Norway, come to about $2.5 trillion dollars, not including the unreported 
size of wealth funds of oil-exporting countries in the Middle East. (This total is separate from 
about $5.5 trillion held as foreign exchange reserves by sovereign governments.)  
  It is difficult to predict how much of the resources from these funds will flow into 
international capital markets; for example, some of the resources of these funds may be 
destined for domestic investment in strategic sectors or in infrastructure. But even so, such 
funds raise a number of questions. Has the government the competence to choose profitable 
investments? Will the sovereign fund be so concerned about making losses that it simply 
joins the herd of institutional investors? Will the government exercise influence, not 
motivated by commercial concerns, over the foreign companies it owns? Will it allow foreign 
corporations it invests in undue influence over its own policies?  
  A third approach under consideration in some countries is to expand opportunities for 
private capital outflows, with the hope that this will alleviate appreciation pressures on the 
exchange rate. Many countries such as China and India have loosened the reins on capital    12  
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that can be taken out by corporations and individuals. We will discuss this at greater length 
later. 
  A more basic concern is that the underlying distortions that often contribute to rapid 
reserve accumulation, such as overly rigid exchange rates and repressed financial sectors, 
could have long-term detrimental effects on the economy. While policymakers in emerging 
markets often recognize this point, they are typically under political constraints to restrain 
rapid currency appreciation, because this could hurt export competitiveness. Consequently, 
they are able to allow only modest currency appreciations that, in the short run, generate 
expectations of further appreciation. This pattern, in turn, tends to fuel further speculative 
inflows and makes domestic macroeconomic management even more complicated.  
 
Changes in the Composition of External Liabilities 
 
One major trigger of balance of payments crises has historically been when a country 
has a large share of short-term debt denominated in foreign currency (Rodrik and Velasco, 
1999). Many emerging markets were unable to generate other, safer, forms of financial 
inflows during the 1980s and 1990s, perhaps because foreign investors feared the countries’ 
weak institutions, bad policies, or worse still, possible expropriation (see, for example, 
Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Jeanne, 2000, Rajan and Tokatlidis 2005). Whatever the 
underlying cause, sudden stops of capital inflows in this situation mean that countries cannot 
finance their debts, which in turn leads to more capital fleeing the country and a plummeting 
exchange rate. When the exchange rate depreciates, it becomes difficult for the country to 
repay its foreign-currency denominated borrowing, which can lead to a collapse of the 
banking sector.   
  However, the share of foreign direct investment flows has now become far more 
important than that of debt in gross private capital flows to nonindustrial countries. Table 1 
(top panel) shows how these shares have evolved for emerging markets and other developing 
countries. The share of foreign direct investment in total gross inflows to emerging markets 
and other developing countries rose from about 25 percent in 1990-94 to nearly 50 percent by 
2000-04. Over the same period, the share of debt (including portfolio debt and bank loans) in 
inflows to emerging markets fell from 64 percent to 39 percent. There has been a similar but    13  
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more gradual evolution in the composition of stocks of external liabilities (Table 1, lower 
panel).  
  Moreover, when emerging market countries do borrow, they have had less need to 
borrow in a foreign currency; foreign investors now enthusiastically buy bonds denominated 
in many local currencies – even from countries that suffered financial crises just a few years 
ago. For example, during 2004-05, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay issued bonds denominated 
in local currency to foreign investors. These bonds were not indexed to inflation, had 
reasonably long maturities, and had low spreads relative to industrial country bonds.  
  Countries that have experienced an increase in the share of foreign direct investment 
and a decrease in borrowing in foreign-denominated currencies face lower risks from capital 
account liberalization. Domestic currency-denominated debt is of course safer for the issuing 
country because it does not create the risk that currency depreciation will make it difficult or 
impossible to repay the debt. Of course, only time will tell how much these developments 
reflect temporary benign worldwide financing conditions, and how much they reflect 
permanent changes.  
 
From Fixed Exchange Rates to Inflation Targeting 
 
Many emerging market economies once used a fixed exchange rate as the primary 
target for their monetary policy. Fixed exchange rates can be useful for economies at early 
stages of financial development and could serve as a useful nominal anchor, especially if 
their central banks are not credible (Husain, Mody, and Rogoff, 2005). One hope behind this 
policy was that a fixed exchange rate would make it easier for the country to carry out 
foreign trade and investment, because the risks of foreign exchange fluctuations would be 
reduced. However, as these economies opened their capital markets, they encountered severe 
risks.  
  A number of papers have made the point that the combination of open capital 
accounts and de facto fixed exchange rates has precipitated many of the financial and balance 
of payments crises witnessed in the last two decades. Edwards (2007) summarizes these 
arguments and provides new empirical evidence that, for countries that have relatively open    14  
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capital accounts, a fixed exchange rate significantly increases the probability of a capital flow 
contraction.   
  An increasing number of emerging market economies have begun to switch to more 
flexible exchange rate regimes, with many of them using an inflation target rather than a 
fixed exchange rate as the anchor for their monetary policy. The academic literature suggests 
that giving monetary policy the operational independence to focus on low inflation is the best 
way that monetary policy can contribute to overall macroeconomic and financial stability (for 
discussion and some critical perspectives, see Bernanke and Woodford, 2004). Rose (2006) 
provides empirical evidence that inflation targeters have lower exchange rate volatility and 
fewer sudden stops than similar countries that do not target inflation. He also notes that this 
monetary regime seems durable—no country has yet been forced to abandon an inflation 
targeting regime. Of course, emerging markets are only recently beginning to adopt this 
regime in significant numbers and international capital markets have been relatively calm 
during the 2000s, and so this regime hasn’t really been tested much yet. However, flexible 
exchange rates do offer an important shock absorber for an economy that is becoming more 
integrated into international trade and financial markets.  
  Conducting monetary policy with a framework of inflation targeting and flexible 
exchange rates can still leave policymakers with a difficult set of options in the short run if 
there are surges in foreign capital inflows. Inflows translate into increases in domestic 
liquidity that result in inflationary pressures, which require monetary policy tightening in the 
form of higher interest rates. This response, in turn, can induce even more capital inflows. An 
appreciation of flexible exchange rates can of course act as a shock absorber, reducing 
domestic inflation and tamping down inflows. However, very rapid exchange rate 
appreciation can also hurt external competitiveness, because exporting firms have little time 
to boost their productivity sufficiently to avoid becoming uncompetitive.  
  Thailand is an example of an Asian economy that allowed its exchange rate to 
appreciate significantly in order to maintain its inflation target. India’s experience has been 
similar, with the real effective exchange rate of the rupee appreciating by about 12 percent 
during 2007, notwithstanding a current account deficit. Exporters in countries experiencing 
such rapid currency appreciation have complained loudly of reduced competitiveness and job 
losses. In India, these pressures have led the government to compensate exporters directly    15  
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using fiscal transfers. However, a country with an open capital market is probably better off 
dealing with the problems of currency fluctuations, rather than attempting the risky policy 




Many emerging market economies and developing countries have liberalized trade 
flows by reducing tariff and nontariff barriers. Figure 2 shows that the volume of total trade 
expressed as a ratio to GDP has increased significantly since the mid-1980s for both 
emerging markets and other developing countries. Indeed, the trade openness ratio for 
virtually every emerging market economy has increased steadily and, for some economies, 
quite markedly over the last two decades.  
  Economies that are more open to trade are also more favorably placed for capital 
account liberalization for two broad reasons. First, they face less risk from sudden stops or 
reversals of capital inflows because they are in a better position to service their external 
obligations through their export revenues and are less likely to default (Calvo, Izquierdo, and 
Mejia, 2004; Frankel and Cavallo, 2004). Furthermore, more open economies have to 
undergo a smaller real exchange rate depreciation for a given current account adjustment; 
hence, among countries that have experienced sudden stops or current account reversals, 
those that are more open to trade face smaller adverse growth effects and are able to recover 
faster (Edwards, 2004, 2005).  
  Second, expanding trade is in effect a form of capital account liberalization, because 
it provides a simple avenue to evade capital account restrictions. For instance, by over-
invoicing exports, an exporter can funnel money into his home country—that is, by making 
the capital inflow associated with the exports greater than the actual market value of exports. 
Of course, this requires a willing counterparty at the other end to facilitate such a transaction; 
the proliferation of multinationals and foreign-owned subsidiaries has made this much easier. 
Similarly, over-invoicing of imports provides a conduit for taking money out of a country.  
  In China during the late 1990s, for example, the “errors and omissions” category of 
the balance of payments was large and negative, which was widely believed to  reflect capital 
outflows through unofficial channels (Prasad and Wei, 2007). As the renminbi has come    16  
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under increasing pressures for appreciation during this decade, the sign of the errors and 
omissions category switched and the magnitude grew rapidly until 2005, indicative of capital 
inflows through unofficial channels, notwithstanding extensive controls on inflows. As 
China’s government tightened up its capital controls to try and stanch speculative inflows, 
the errors and omissions fell to near zero in 2006 but the trade surplus rose dramatically, 
buoyed by remarkably high rates of export growth. A portion of this increase in reported 
exports and the trade surplus is believed by some analysts to reflect speculative inflows 




Recent economic developments have generally created a more benign environment in 
which countries can become more open. But the risks are not inconsequential. Many 
emerging market countries are still below the necessary threshold levels of institutional and 
financial development. The capacity of these countries to weather the volatility associated 
with foreign capital flows, especially surges in inflows, followed by sudden stops, is limited. 
An underdeveloped financial system, which is typical of many developing economies, is 
more likely to channel foreign capital to easily collateralized non-tradeable investments like 
real estate, thereby contributing to asset price booms (and the risk of disruptions from 
subsequent busts). Similarly, foreign portfolio equity flows into shallow equity markets could 
lead to disruptive sharp swings. In the absence of other financial assets in some emerging 
markets, foreign investors may also use equity markets in these countries to bet on currency 
appreciation, thereby distorting asset values and adding to the risk of speculative bubbles. 
  Large capital inflows could also result in rapid real exchange rate appreciation, which 
can hurt manufacturing exports (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005; Bhalla, 2007; Johnson, 
Ostry, and Subramanian, 2007; Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2007; Rodrik, 2007). Even 
a relatively short-term appreciation can sometimes lead to longer-lived consequences like 
loss of market share in export markets and reductions in manufacturing capacity.  
  In sum, while the environment is benign, countries may want to liberalize more so as 
to reap some of the benefits of openness such as financial market development, but only if 
they can limit some of the costs such as potential exchange rate overvaluation. The need to    17  
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consider a pragmatic approach becomes all the more important because as trade expands the 
world over,  the effectiveness of capital controls is rapidly eroding, even in a tightly-
controlled economy like China. It is becoming increasingly easy for capital to find loopholes 
and channels for evading these controls. Is there a constructive way to make progress that 
does not result in precipitous opening of the capital account and the attendant risks? In the 
next section we discuss what countries have tried to do; in the following section, we offer 
some suggestions of our own.  
 
Approaches to Restricting and Liberalizing Capital Flows 
 
Before we turn to liberalization, let us start by asking whether countries have been 





The measures that countries have put in place to control capital flows come in various 
flavors. For example, controls can be imposed on inflows or outflows; on different types of 
flows (like foreign direct investment, portfolio equity, or portfolio debt); flows of different 
maturities; and flows into specific sectors. Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2006, Appendix I) 
provides a detailed taxonomy of capital controls. Do capital controls affect capital flows in 
the intended way?  Do capital controls lead to better macroeconomic outcomes? The answer 
to this second question cannot be conclusive because the counterfactual is not clear, so our 
discussion on this point can only be suggestive. 
  In recent decades, a number of countries have imposed capital controls, usually in 
response to short-term problems with international capital flows. Some Latin American 
economies imposed controls on capital outflows during the 1980s and 1990s, but typically 
did not succeed in stemming capital flight by domestic economic agents.  
  During the Asian crisis of 1997 through mid-1998, the Malaysian ringgit came under 
severe depreciation pressures as foreign exchange reserves fell rapidly and portfolio outflows 
surged. However, Malaysia declined IMF financial assistance and in September 1998, the    18  
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Malaysian government pegged the ringgit to the dollar and introduced sweeping controls on 
portfolio outflows. The Malaysian experience is sometimes touted as an example of the 
success of capital controls, although there are different interpretations of how effective these 
were in practice and how important they were in Malaysia’s recovery from the Asian crisis.  
Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) argue that the imposition of controls had beneficial 
macroeconomic effects, especially compared to the experiences of countries such as Korea 
and Thailand that accepted IMF programs during the crisis. Dornbusch (2001) rejects this 
view, noting that the capital controls came quite late, after the region had already begun to 
stabilize. In terms of the efficacy of capital controls, one key difference between Malaysia 
and the Latin American economies is that Malaysia had tight control of its banking system, 
which meant that channels for capital flight could be shut off more easily.  
  Countries have also attempted to control inflows. Chile, which faced massive inflows 
during the early 1990s, is the canonical example. The authorities imposed an unremunerated 
reserve requirement of 20 percent on short-term debt inflows in 1991. In subsequent years, as 
investors began to exploit various loopholes, the authorities attempted to stay ahead of the 
game by increasing the reserve requirements and extending them to different types of 
inflows, and by imposing a minimum “stay” requirement on foreign direct investment and 
portfolio equity inflows. De Gregorio, Edwards and Valdes (2000) argue that the controls did 
not affect the volume of inflows but were successful in tilting the maturity structure of debt 
inflows--away from short-term and towards longer-term loans. These authors argue that the 
reasonable effectiveness of the Chilean controls on capital inflows is attributable to an 
effective government with low corruption, and to the nimbleness of the authorities in 
clamping down on evasion. However, the Chilean experience also suggests that capital 
controls with more than the most modest objectives will eventually lose effectiveness as the 
private sector finds ways to get around even the most innovative regulators.  
  More recent examples include Thailand and India, which have tried to manage the 
frothiness in their equity markets that has been abetted by foreign capital inflows. In 
December 2006, the Thai central bank imposed a tax on short-term portfolio equity inflows. 
The announcement of this measure set off a 15 percent one-day fall in the main stock price 
index, causing the government to largely retract it. The government of India, fearing that 
foreign inflows were feeding house price inflation, and also into upward pressure on the    19  
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rupee, attempted in May and August 2007 to limit external commercial borrowing by certain 
corporate entities. However, firms have circumvented this restriction by disguising their 
borrowing through other channels (for example, by delaying repayments on trade finance and 
thereby effectively getting a temporary loan). One lesson from these episodes is that when 
capital controls have previously been eliminated, reinstating them can have substantial 
effects on asset prices, and will thus be politically very difficult. This irreversibility means 
that the opening of the capital account should be driven by longer-term considerations.  
  These episodes suggest a few other general lessons about capital controls. First, 
inflows are easier to control than outflows; once channels for outflows are opened up, they 
can be much harder to shut down when there are large pressures for capital to flee (Reinhart 
and Smith, 2002; Magud, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2005). Second, capital controls work better 
when the financial system is reasonably well regulated and supervised, and domestic 
institutions are reasonably strong. This finding has an ironic tone, because these conditions of 
course make it less likely that controls will be needed in the first place. Third, new capital 
controls pose a significant administrative burden—they need to be constantly updated to 
close loopholes and, in any event, tend not to be effective beyond the short term.  
  Even when capital controls are effective in a narrow sense, they can have significant 
costs. In the case of Chile, the capital controls penalized short-term credit. As a consequence, 
small and medium-sized firms (and also new firms), which typically find it harder to issue 
long-term bonds, faced much higher costs of capital (Forbes, 2005). Capital controls can also 
affect overall economic efficiency by conferring undue benefits to politically well-connected 
firms (invariably, quotas on inflows get implemented in an arbitrary fashion by the 
government) and protecting incumbents from competition. Johnson, Kochhar, Mitton, and 
Tamirisa (2006) provide some evidence of this phenomenon for Malaysia. There is also 
increasing microeconomic evidence of the distortionary costs of capital controls (see the 
survey by Forbes, 2005). Desai, Foley and Hines (2006) show that capital controls distort the 
investment decisions of multinational firms. Finally, an accumulating body of evidence 
indicates that capital controls by themselves do not serve their main stated purpose of 
reducing the probability of financial crises, especially banking crises. Edwards (2005) and 
Glick, Guo and Hutchison (2006) find that there is no relationship between de jure capital 
account openness and crises.    20  
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Liberalizing the Capital Account 
 
Capital account liberalization can imply removing impediments to inflows of capital, 
or allowing domestic investors to invest more freely in foreign assets. We catalogue various 
approaches that countries have taken to freeing capital inflows and outflows, and discuss the 
pros and cons of some of these approaches. 
  Inflows of foreign direct investment are considered quite attractive for an emerging 
market economy. They tend to be more stable than other types of capital flows (unlike 
portfolio equity and bank loans, which can be reversed quickly) and also tend to bring in 
more transfers of technological and managerial expertise. China has successfully tilted its 
flows largely towards foreign direct investment by encouraging those inflows, even at the 
expense of domestic industry (Prasad and Wei, 2007).
  For example, until recently, China’s 
income tax on joint venture enterprises financed through foreign direct investment inflows 
was set at 15 percent, compared to 33 percent for domestic firms. China also set up special 
economic zones to attract foreign direct investment by providing additional incentives such 
as better infrastructure, less red tape, and exemptions from local labor laws. One lesson from 
China’s experience is that trade liberalization is important for attracting foreign direct 
investment—the ability to use China as an export-processing platform has encouraged 
substantial foreign direct investment from other East Asian countries. The focus on foreign 
direct investment, however, has deprived China of one of the key indirect benefits of 
financial integration--the catalytic effect on development of the domestic financial market.  
  A number of emerging market economies have undertaken equity market 
liberalizations, which make shares of common stocks of local firms available to foreign 
investors. Equity market liberalizations appear to boost economic growth (Henry, 2000; 
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2005); firm-level evidence suggests that they have a positive 
impact on profitability, efficiency, and other measures of operating performance (Chari and 
Henry, 2005; Mitton, 2006).  
Some countries have permitted entry of foreign banks, and have generally found that 
this can act as a spur for improved efficiency of the overall banking system as domestic 
banks are forced to raise their service and risk-assessment standards to compete. For 
example, starting in early 2007, China has in principle allowed free foreign bank entry, and    21  
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even before that, China had allowed a small group of foreign banks to take minority stakes in 
a few of the largest state-owned banks. The idea behind China’s policy was to use these 
“foreign strategic investors” to introduce better corporate governance practices and other 
innovations to local banks, without exposing the local banks to full-fledged competition from 
foreign banks. Foreign banks also often introduce new saving and loan instruments, thereby 
widening the range of choices available to depositors and borrowers. However, the presence 
of foreign banks poses difficult regulatory and supervisory challenges, particularly since 
local bank supervisors may have little familiarity with complex financial instruments. 
Foreign banks can also introduce channels for moving capital in and out of a country, 
rendering capital controls less effective.  
  A few countries such as China and Taiwan have sought to cautiously encourage 
capital inflows and outflows by limiting portfolio investments (those that do not involve 
foreign direct investment) to certain carefully screened qualified foreign or domestic 
institutional investors. The logic behind this approach is to maintain control on capital 
inflows and outflows by limiting the number of players. A related approach has been taken 
by the Reserve Bank of India, which decided upon a particular hierarchy of economic agents 
that would benefit from a liberalization of outflows, with the intent being to first liberalize 
outflows for corporations, and eventually for individuals; Reddy (2007) describes the 
rationale for this approach. In particular, corporations have been implicitly encouraged to 
make foreign acquisitions, with the idea that domestic financing for these takeovers would 
lead to a net outflow of reserves. In practice, however, domestic Indian banks have often 
been too small, too unsophisticated, or have had too high a cost of funds to compete with 
foreign lenders in financing these acquisitions. Hence, only a small amount of the needed 
funding for foreign takeovers is raised domestically, resulting in little outflow.  
  A recurring theme in many of the approaches to capital account liberalization is the 
government’s desire to maintain some control over the composition and quantity of capital 
inflows and outflows. However, the surge in overall international capital flows, and the 
increasing sophistication of international investors, has made it harder to shape financial 
flows into or out of a country. And attempts to control capital flows invariably reduce the 
indirect benefits of financial globalization.   
    22  
  22
A Pragmatic Approach to Capital Account Liberalization  
 
Rather than viewing capital account liberalization as a one-shot, all-or-nothing 
phenomenon, that under all circumstances is welfare-improving, a pragmatic policy would 
design a gradual and opportunistic approach to capital account liberalization that takes into 
account individual country circumstances. 
A pragmatic approach would recognize: 
 
1)  Not all countries are ready for capital account liberalization – typically the more 
developed the country, the readier it is. However, some may want to liberalize to improve 
institutions even if the net benefits do not seem to be overwhelming. Others may want to 
liberalize because leakages through trade are creating de-facto channels for capital to 
flow.  
2)  Liberalizing flows and strengthening institutions at a time when the country’s economic 
situation is good and the external environment is relatively benign can stimulate the 
institutional development that will sustain the country even when the environment turns. 
For example, deepening domestic currency debt markets in benign times by allowing 
more foreign participation can give the country more options in harsher times, and reduce 
its reliance on riskier foreign currency debt. Similarly, allowing domestic households a 
greater ability to hold globally-diversified asset portfolios can reduce their exposure to 
domestic shocks. 
 
But there are costs to opening up. Substantial inflows could lead to an overvalued 
exchange rate, and as we have argued, there are limits to sterilization.  
   
3)  Rather than the central bank intervening and sterilizing these inflows, and accumulating 
more reserves, a pragmatic approach would focus at this time on encouraging more 
international portfolio diversification by domestic investors, that is, encouraging 
outflows. The easiest way is to push government controlled pension funds and insurance 
companies to invest more of their holdings internationally. Less easy is to get households 
to diversify abroad at a time when their own country’s markets are being buoyed by    23  
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international interest. This may require an active education campaign on the benefits of 
international portfolio diversification so as to reduce natural home bias. In addition, the 
channels for them to take their money out have to be made more accessible and easier to 
use. 
 
But this raises the dilemma – how to prevent possible capital flight when times turn 
adverse?  Shutting off international access for individuals in bad times may be difficult, and 
even impose costs if they have entered into situations where they have to put up further 
capital (e.g., margin calls) to maintain their investments.   
 
4)  It is best if in the early stages of liberalization, these private sector outflows are easily 
controlled. We offer a proposal next. 
 
A modest proposal for controlled outflows 
 
The risks we have outlined above would suggest a more controlled approach to 
capital account liberalization that essentially channels household flows through institutions. 
The country authorizes a number of closed-end mutual funds to issue shares, denominated in 
the domestic currency.
2 These mutual funds will use the proceeds to purchase foreign 
exchange from the central bank and then invest this foreign exchange abroad, in a wide array 
of foreign assets. The central bank would control the timing and amount of outflows by 
stipulating the amount of foreign exchange it would make available to the mutual funds in a 
given period. Licenses for such mutual funds could be auctioned by the government to foster 
competition and capture any rents. The sale of foreign exchange to the mutual funds would 
take place at the market exchange rate. This scheme essentially securitizes reserves as shown 
in the schematic diagram in Figure 3, where the Chinese currency—the renminbi —is the 
domestic currency (see Prasad and Rajan, 2005, for more details). 
                                                 
2  Open-ended mutual funds could achieve much the same objective except that they may 
engender more frequent flows and therefore complicate the licensing of fund flows for the 
central bank.    24  
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  The government would need to maintain clear separation from the fund-- other than 
its traditional role in financial sector regulation and supervision--to avoid any presumption of 
bailouts if asset values plunge. Given that a large number of domestic citizens will be 
investing in these funds, the government risks angering many if it expropriates assets, and 
thus the structure of our proposal builds in some natural protection against expropriation.  
  To understand the merits of this plan, it’s useful to consider why some close 
alternatives would be inferior. For example, the central bank could itself create an investment 
vehicle for purchasing foreign assets. This would require the central bank to acquire 
investment skills, and it is not clear why it would be able to do so better than the private 
sector, especially given the constraints on pay in the public sector (also, the problems 
associated with sovereign wealth funds discussed earlier would apply here also). It could sell 
shares in that investment vehicle to domestic investors. However, this approach would create 
a direct link between the government and investors that could be detrimental, especially 
because it could create pressures for a bailout if the investment vehicle were to generate poor 
returns or losses.  
  Our proposal would give domestic retail investors experience with international 
investments and allow for gradual learning-by-investing, while giving them more choice and 
potential diversification in their portfolios of financial assets. In countries with weak 
financial systems, this approach would give domestic banks some breathing room to adjust to 
the new reality of their depositors having alternative investment opportunities, and it would 
leave the recycling of foreign inflows to the private sector rather than to the government. 
Private sector institutions could gain expertise in investing in foreign assets. These 
developments would improve the depth and efficiency of the domestic financial sector, and 
better prepare the ground for an eventual fuller capital account liberalization.  
  Also, unlike proposals that would give open-ended mutual funds the right to invest 
abroad up to a aggregate dollar amount (across all funds) that is determined every year, our 
proposal would remove the uncertainty about how much a fund can invest, right at the outset. 
Similarly, the closed end funds cannot be an explicit channel for foreigners to repatriate 
money, so they are unlikely to prompt greater inflows from foreign investors (unlike other 
channels liberalizing outflows, that could prompt greater inflows).    25  
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  If appropriately structured, our proposal has limited downside risk. At worst, if 
domestic investors felt that returns in domestic investments trump the need for international 
portfolio diversification, there would be no demand for the securities of the new mutual 
funds.  The liabilities of the mutual funds would be denominated in domestic currency, which 
eliminates the risk that speculative runs on the currency would cause a debt crisis. Thus, the 
proposal would allow countries to make progress towards the goal of capital account 
convertibility in a calibrated manner, without exposing the domestic financial system to risks 




The main benefits of capital account liberalization for emerging markets appear to be 
indirect, more related to their role in building other institutions than to the increased 
financing provided by capital inflows. These indirect benefits are important enough that 
countries should look for creative approaches to capital account liberalization that would help 
attain these benefits while reducing the risks. In fact, countries don’t have much of a choice 
but to plan for capital account liberalization, because capital accounts are de facto becoming 
more open over time irrespective of government attempts to control them.  
  This is not to say that capital account liberalization is an appropriate policy objective 
for all countries and in all circumstances. For poor countries with weak policies and 
institutions, capital account liberalization should not be a major priority. However, even this 
group includes some poor but resource-rich countries that are having to deal with capital 
inflows and their mixed benefits. These countries need a strategy, rather than just coping in 
an ad hoc way with the whims of international investors. Indeed, a key lesson from country 
experiences is that capital account liberalization works best when other policies are 
disciplined and not working at cross-purposes (Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2003).  
Ultimately, a framework to achieve capital account liberalization could help set in 
motion broader reforms and break the power of interest groups that seek to block reforms 
(Rajan and Zingales, 2003b). China’s commitment to open up its banking sector to foreign 
competition by the beginning of 2007 can be seen in this light. The Chinese government has 
used the prospect of increased competition to spur reforms in the state-owned banking sector    26  
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and used foreign strategic investors to bring in not just capital but also knowledge about 
better risk-management and corporate governance practices into domestic banks. Similarly, 
in India and many other emerging economies, the entry of foreign banks has helped spur 
efficiency gains in the domestic banking system and provided a fillip to banking reforms. In 
this way, capital account liberalization may best be seen not just as an independent objective 
but as part of an organizing framework for policy changes in a number of dimensions (see 
Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei, 2008). 
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1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Gross Inflows
Emerging Markets (in billions of U.S. dollars) 66 60 194 328 288
Share of Debt 83.0 69.3 63.9 48.2 39.3
Share of FDI 15.5 27.3 24.4 40.7 48.6
Share of Equity 1.5 3.4 11.7 11.0 12.1
Other Developing Countries (in billions of U.S. dollars) 6 4 7 13 16
Share of Debt 83.8 82.2 71.8 58.6 55.4
Share of FDI 15.1 17.2 27.7 40.9 44.2
Share of Equity 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4
Gross External Liabilities
Emerging Markets (in billions of U.S. dollars) 611 865 1,356 2,585 3,469
Share of Debt 84.6 83.7 70.9 61.1 51.7
Share of FDI 14.2 14.6 21.5 29.0 36.7
Share of Equity 1.2 1.8 7.6 10.0 11.5
Other Developing Countries (in billions of U.S. dollars) 71 101 129 170 222
Share of Debt 79.9 84.1 81.2 73.7 64.9
Share of FDI 19.8 15.4 18.3 25.5 33.6





Sources: Data for the top panel are taken from Table 2 of Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei 
(2006), which is based on data from the IMF's International Financial Statistics and Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2006). The lower panel is based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and 
authors' calculations. 
 
Notes: "Debt” is defined as the sum of portfolio debt, bank loans & deposits, and other debt 
instruments FDI is foreign direct investment and "equity" refers to portfolio equity flows.  
Data are based on cross-country averages of annual data over the relevant five-year period. 
The sample covers 20 emerging markets and 30 other developing countries.    34  
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Figure 1. Foreign Exchange Reserves Held by Non-industrial Economies 
(in trillions of U.S. dollars) 
 
Sources: The IMF’s International Financial Statistics and authors’ calculations     
Note: This figure is based on data for147 countries. 
 
Figure 2. Trade Openness 
(the sum of imports and exports as a ratio to GDP, in 2000 constant prices) 
 
 
Sources: Penn World Tables 6.2 and authors' calculations 
Notes: The sample comprises 20 emerging markets and 30 other developing countries. The 
statistics shown above are based on cross-sectional distributions of the openness measure, 





   Figure 3. Securitizing Foreign Exchange Reserves 
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